Putin turns 74: Russia’s losses, the cost of war and the bill future generations will inherit

According to the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Russia’s estimated cumulative combat losses since the start of the full-scale invasion stood at the following levels on 7 October 2026:

Demilitarizator’s full calculation contains a baseline estimate of approximately $1.175 trillion, displayed on the homepage as ≈$1.17 trillion.

It comprises:

• approximately $675 billion in military and related government spending;
• approximately $199.6 billion in estimated lost oil-export revenue;
• approximately $300 billion in frozen sovereign reserves.

The rate of military spending is approximately $475 million a day, $3.3 billion a week and $14 billion over 30 days.

Money already spent will not reappear in the budget. Repairs, restoring production and helping those affected will require new funds.

For this comparison, consider only the $675 billion in military and related government spending included in the site’s model. A hypothetical allocation of this sum illustrates the following scale:

An analysis by Cursor, published in July 2026, found that funding for a specific federal cancer-control project fell from 148.46 billion to 44.9 billion roubles — a reduction of approximately 70%.

Funding for projects to modernise primary healthcare fell by 52%, improve emergency care by 27%, and provide medical rehabilitation by 25%.

These figures concern specific federal programmes, rather than all treatment or the entire healthcare system.

According to budget documents analysed by Reuters, planned federal funding for 2027 is being reduced by 7% for social policy, 6% for education and 6.8% for healthcare compared with the previous plan for that same year. These are federal figures, excluding regional and municipal budgets.

Delayed healthcare and education projects leave a lasting mark. Equipment ages, buildings need repairs, and training specialists takes years.

Russia’s utility networks were deteriorating long before the full-scale invasion. The war has made renewal harder: sanctions have restricted access to some imported equipment, while military production and conscription have intensified competition for workers. Old pipes and boiler plants continue operating with repairs postponed.

An accident in Bodaybo, Irkutsk Oblast, showed the consequences. After a water main froze in late January 2026, residents were left without normal water supplies and heating. By early February, the problem had lasted more than a week in temperatures as low as minus 30–40 degrees Celsius. Residents complained that utility bills were still arriving.

One accident does not describe the whole country. It illustrates how the danger spreads: a broken water main shuts down boiler plants; the cold forces people to turn on electric heaters; and the additional load creates further electricity problems.

The longer network renewal is delayed, the more expensive the next repair may become. Savings today accumulate risks for the next winter.

In a July Reuters report, farmers in Rostov Oblast described rising diesel prices, fuel queues and difficulties selling grain because of shipping restrictions in the Sea of Azov. Under these conditions, even a good harvest can leave a farm with little profit.

In the first half of 2026, production of tractors fell by 14.3%, balers by 48.6%, and fertiliser application machinery by 34.4%.

The danger for agriculture also lies in accumulating deferred costs. A farm may get through a season using an old tractor. But repairs, replacement and the next fuel purchase do not disappear.

Sectors showing clear signs of crisis include steelmaking and coal mining.

In the first quarter of 2026, Severstal’s net profit fell from 21.1 billion to 57 million roubles — almost to zero. Revenue declined by 19%. The company linked the results to falling demand for steel.

In March, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works reported that it was operating at approximately 60% of capacity, suspending new investment and planning to cut some management positions. Weak demand, expensive credit and sanctions were among the reasons.

In the coal industry, 64.5% of enterprises were loss-making in January–July 2026. The sector’s aggregate financial result before tax was minus 178.2 billion roubles. Losses had decreased compared with the previous year, but the industry remained deeply unprofitable.

For industrial towns, a prolonged crisis at major employers creates risks well beyond the factory gate. Fewer orders mean weaker demand for transport, repairs and contractors’ services. Reduced activity at the main enterprise can gradually affect the entire local economy.

Under Demilitarizator’s current tally, as of 6 October 2026, at least 842 strike events had been recorded for the year, including at least 49 in September.

According to BOFIT’s analysis, Russian petroleum-product output fell by approximately 20% year on year in July and August 2026. Damage to refineries caused by Ukrainian strikes was one of the decisive factors.

Russian budget revenue from oil and gas fell by approximately 17% in January–September 2026.

A BOFIT study covering 2021–2024 found that the typical price increase for sanctioned goods sold by China to Russia was 87%, compared with 9% for sales of comparable goods to other countries. This is the median figure in the sample studied.

In a review dated 7 August 2026, BOFIT also noted that, in the most recent months of the period examined, China bought Russian oil at a discount of more than 10% compared with oil from other suppliers.

Fewer alternatives weaken bargaining power. More expensive equipment increases producers’ costs, while cheaper sales of raw materials reduce their revenue.

Russia retains the ability to finance military operations. At the same time, BOFIT’s October forecast expects GDP growth of approximately 0.5% a year in 2027–2028 and further difficulties financing the budget deficit.

Continuing the war risks accumulating further losses: more wounded people, damaged businesses, repairs and delayed civilian projects. Their consequences may persist for years.

A destroyed installation must be rebuilt. A lost market must be replaced. A wounded person needs treatment. Worn-out networks need repairs. All of this must happen alongside the needs of everyday life.

The war may end before the payment for its consequences does. The greater the accumulated losses, the more work and resources recovery will require.